1 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1996. Joint Vision 2010, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1998. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through December 7, 1998, Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
3 For example, in the Gulf War, C4I system incompatibilities made it impossible to electronically transmit the Air Tasking Order to Navy carriers, making delivery of paper copies necessary.
4 William S. Cohen. 1998. Secretary of Defense Report to Congress: Actions to Accelerate the Movement to the New Workforce Vision, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. This report also tasked a study to develop an improved, cross-service process for developing joint capabilities.
5 The Joint Interoperability Test Center of the Defense Information Systems Agency is responsible for testing and evaluating C4I acquisitions and systems, as well as identifying and solving C4I interoperability problems. As part of its work, it compiles the quarterly compilation of lessons learned, which addresses "C4I interoperability problems/issues related to Joint/Combined C4I and integration of information systems within the Defense Information Infrastructure."
6 Col. Stephen E. Anno and Lt. Col. William E. Einsphar (no date). Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid, Air War College Research Report No. AU-AWC-88-043, Air University, United States Air Force, Maxwell Air Force Base.
7 Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). 1996. Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 1996 Report, Defense Information Systems Agency C4I Modeling, Simulation and Assessment Division, DISA, Arlington, Va.
8 General Accounting Office. 1998. Joint Military Operations: Weakness in DOD's Process for Certifying C4I Systems' Interoperability, GAO/NSIAD-98-73, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
9 This phenomenon was seen in commercial industry 20 to 30 years ago. Early application of computing technology that automated the functions of individual business units took place in parallel without attention to enterprise-wide concerns, compounding later interoperability problems. Later developments, such as a shift in technology and approach from reliance on departmental minicomputers to use of client-server configurations, helped resolve these problems.
10 Open Shortest Path First routing calls for traffic to be routed through open paths that are physically shortest. In a static environment, path lengths are known, and congestion on any particular path is a function only of the traffic being carried in the network. But in a dynamic environment (e.g., a battlefield), path lengths change unpredictably. In particular, an airborne command post may suddenly find itself in a position that routing through the command post is the routing of choice for Open Shortest Path First. If this happens, all battlefield traffic may be routed through it, thus overloading the node.
11 As discussed in section 2.2.1, backward compatibility is supported in the commercial sector for only a limited number of generations. Such practices are reasonable in the commercial world given the rate at which users are upgrading hardware. Whether the same time scales should govern military acquisition of C4I systems is less important than the underlying point--at some point determined by the underlying information technology (and not by the C4I system of which it is a part), compatibility efforts may have to be abandoned and incompatible upgrades may prove to be essential.
12 For example, companies such as SAP--and a host of consultants and implementers--have built a multibillion-dollar business around replacing existing systems in support of reengineering efforts and mergers and other new combinations of business units.
13 Eberhardt Rechtin. 1996. The Art of Systems Architecting, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle, New Jersey.
14 See Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council. 1994. Realizing the Information Future: The Internet and Beyond, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
15 Adapted from Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council. 1994. Realizing the Information Future: The Internet and Beyond, Chapter 2, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
16 Note that some historians of the telecommunications infrastructure argue that this integration was driven by government regulation. The market, circa 1985, was not interoperable and did not want to be--it was dominated by AT&T, which did not want to interconnect with the more than 6000 small networks.
17 In DOD parlance, operational testing.
18 The committee learned about this strategy through various briefings, discussions, and site visits.
19 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1995. Instruction 6212.01A: Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., June.
20 William S. Cohen. 1998. Annual Report to the President and to Congress, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. Appendix K is
available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/>.
21 Information Superiority Campaign Plan, J-6, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/j6.html>.
22 Note, however, that this homogeneous common infrastructure constitutes a potential information security vulnerability. See section 3.2.5.
23 Department of Defense Directive 8230.1-M, "DOD Data Administration," September 26, 1991.
24 The Defense Information System Agency's Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Shared Data Environment (SHADE) Capstone Document, July 11, 1996, is the basis for this discussion. This document and additional information regarding SHADE can be found online at <http://diides.ncr.disa.mil/mdreg/user/index.cfm>.
25 Such an approach has been used by DOD as part of a structured process for describing and evaluating levels of interoperability vis-à-vis operationally driven requirements (the so-called levels of information system interoperability).
26 The scoring must also take into account the diversity of system versions that are likely to be fielded at any given time. While version 2.1 of system A may interoperate with system B, version 2.2 might not.
27 See, for example, General Accounting Office. 1993. Joint Military Operations: DOD's Renewed Emphasis on Interoperability Is Important But Not Adequate, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
28 Office of the Inspector General. 1997. Implementation of the DOD Joint Technical Architecture, Report No. 98-023, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., November 11.
29 General Accounting Office. 1998. Joint Military Operations——Weaknesses in DOD's Process for Certifying C41 Systems' Interoperability, GAO/NSIAD-98-73, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., March 1.
30 In one instance where this authority was exercised, the Army Acquisition Executive acted to ensure that Force XXI systems would be built in compliance with the Army technical architecture.
31 Another candidate mission slice is joint strike--the use of air, sea-based, and land forces to conduct air and artillery strikes behind enemy lines. Execution of this inherently joint mission depends on a demanding set of joint tasks such as dynamic target tasking and managing airspace use (deconfliction).
32 There are also ongoing efforts by the Air Force Science Advisory Board to explore other broader approaches (in addition to JTA and common infrastructure) that complement the mission slice approach.
33 See William S. Cohen. 1998. Secretary of Defense Report to Congress: Actions to Accelerate the Movement to the New Workforce Vision, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.
34 Currently, commanders may find it impossible to solve significant interoperability problems between C4I systems rapidly enough to be useful in a contingency. They thus must resort to suboptimal work-arounds employing whatever communications links can be established. With appropriate significant technical support, more problems could be solved rapidly enough to be relevant to an operational deployment.
35 In its site visits, the committee observed a close interaction between users and developers at the Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiments in Fort Hood. It also observed the USAF 605th Test Squadron, which is responsible both for acceptance tests that are part of the acquisition cycle (i.e., tests that the new components satisfy a contractual requirement) and readiness tests that are part of a force's decision to deploy an accepted C4I system (i.e., tests that the force knows how to combine the new C4I component with existing components and how to apply them). Both of these examples illustrate the right synergy between developers and users.
36 This tasking derived from an April 1, 1998, Secretary of Defense response to congressional direction in Section 912 (c) of the national Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998.
37 See William S. Cohen. 1998. Secretary of Defense Report to Congress: Actions to Accelerate the Movement to the New Workforce Vision, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. Quoting from the Secretary's report: "From Grenada in 1983 to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, joint operations have been hindered by the inability of forces to share critical information at the rate and at the locations demanded by modern warfare. To attack this problem, I will direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to create a study group that will examine ways to establish a joint command, control and communication integrated system development process that focuses on developing a joint architecture to guide design and achieve integrated systems development."