||NAVSO P-3690: Aquisition Logistics for the Rest Of Us
Watch Out Fors
This following provides selected lessons learned
expressed as "Watch Out Fors" that can become traps if not avoided while
following the guidelines contained in Part III, "Metrics for Assessing
Logistics Program Activities."
- Conducting supportability analysis after critical
design review. Supportability analysis performed after the fact merely
documents design shortcomings, as opposed to supportability influencing the
- The failure to define the maintenance concept by
preliminary design review, which leads to equipment redesign and/or delays
in development of technical documentation, personnel training, or special
test equipment. Failure to accommodate support needs in the detail design
results in program cost growth.
- Total ownership cost analysis not updated when factors that effect
support changes occur.
- Use of new technologies without conducting
trade-studies to identify supportability risks.
- Design Reference Mission Profiles that are simply
extracted from MIL-HDBK 810, "Environmental Engineering Considerations And
Laboratory Tests," 1 Nov 2000.
- Emphasis on testing to assess compliance to
reliability, maintainability and availability requirements rather than for
growth and verification.
- Failure analysis required only when repetitive
- Exclusion of test equipment, government furnished
equipment and commercial-off-the-shelf/non-development item failures from
failure reporting and corrective action system.
- Designs using part technologies whose remaining
life cycle will not support production and postproduction uses.
- In-service use of design limit qualification test
units and other units that are stressed to a level resulting in inadequate
- Commercial-off-the-shelf/non-development item
design that is incompatible with mission needs and program life-cycle
- Testability design that results in special purpose
- Circuit card assemblies and modules with test
points that aren't accessible.
- Limitations to built-in-test coverage/effectiveness caused by:
Non-detectable parts (mechanical parts, redundant connector pins, decoupling
capacitors, one-shot devices, etc.).
- Power filtering circuits.
of special test equipment (e.g., signal generators) to simulate operational
input circuit conditions.
- Interface and/or compatibility problems
between some equipment designs (e.g., digital vs. analog).
- Inadequate time to perform
built-in-test localization/ diagnosis.
- Complex integrated circuits/chips without self-test
- A design that does not reflect the ability to:
- Initialize the
operating characteristics of a system by external means (e.g., disable an
- Control internal functions of a system with external
stimuli (e.g., break up feedback loops).
Selectively access a system's internal partition and parts based on
- System reviews that are primarily programmatic in
nature instead of technical.
- System review schedules that are based on planned
- System reviews not formally documented and reported
- System reviews held by teams without adequate technical knowledge or
representation of manufacturing, product assurance, supportability,
- Product delivery before built in test/ fault
isolation system is fully developed. This typically results in unplanned
support equipment upgrades to enable proper support of the fielded product.
- Utilizing support equipment that cannot be
calibrated in remote field locations.
- Maximizing rather than optimizing the use of
built-in-test equipment in the product design. Maximizing built-in-test
equipment may not be cost effective or necessary to meet support
requirements when considering other automatic and general purpose test
- Support equipment selected and designed prior to a
stable system design.
- Intermediate and depot maintenance being
initialized during support equipment design instability.
- Standard maintenance busses not used to test equipment at all
- Spares requirements determined without using
reliability or failure/usage data.
- Spares/consumables requirements determined without
considering secondary failures or collateral repairs.
- Lack of a shelf life item management program.
- No interim support plan for systems, subsystems, assemblies and
subassemblies with unstable designs.
- Designing and implementing training courses that do
not utilize product engineers and subject matter experts.
- Creation of video-based training directly from
classroom training. These videos are usually of poor quality and are not
effective in holding the student's attention.
- Development of training methods and devices before
a confirmed baseline design has been established.
- Development of instructor and student course
material before the technical manuals have been developed.
- Not validating training material with its associated equipment.
Packaging, Handling, Storage, and
- Use of unqualified containers.
- Design of special handling equipment without researching those available
on the using platforms.
- Engineering change proposals that do not consider
- High rate of design changes, engineering change proposals, waivers and
deviations continuing after critical design review and into
- Design changes after technical manuals have been
- Technical manual development schedule not coordinated with test plans,
production schedules and deployment schedules to ensure the availability of
hardware, software and equipment to support the verification effort.
Environmental, Safety and Occupational
- Lack of a system to identify and manage processing of hazardous material
and waste at the inventory control points, maintenance facilities, storage
activities and shipboard.
- Not identifying facilities support requirements
early enough or more than once during acquisition. If military construction
is required, there is a 5-7 year lead-time required for identification of
the requirement to support planning, programming, design and execution of a
- Not having a process in place to address facilities
and adapt to unforeseen changes due to reliance on programmatic guidance.
- Not integrating facilities with the other logistics
elements (maintenance, training, supply support, etc.) to ensure all
potential facilities impacts are assessed and addressed in a logical and
- Not keeping abreast of changes to Navy mission and
shore infrastructure support. Once a development concept for support of the
system has been developed, continued coordination with fleet activities and
installation major claimants regarding facilities support must occur.
Closures, realignments and other shifts in Naval missions and operations at
a designated support location can affect the best plans and may require
adjustments at any time to ensure required support is in place to support
- Planning to stand-up more than one support site at one time.
Establishing multiple support sites at the same time does not allow the Navy
to allocate resources efficiently and effectively nor apply critical lessons
learned/successes, based upon experience, to subsequent support
Computer Life Cycle
- Contractor requirement for separate software
licenses for each unit being fielded, including operation, support and test
- Warranty provisions that do not specify the
inclusion of software.
- Support of non-standard software.